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Although tension and conflict between Israel and Syria are nothing new, the past decade 
has seen numerous important shifts in the details of their relationship.  Billings and Hermann 
(1998) have argued that one of the possible factors underlying such shifts can be re-
representation of the problem by one or both parties to a conflict.  This project seeks to 
determine whether the events of this period have lead to one or both sides re-representing the 
fundamental problems which they face as described by Billings and Hermann.  Further, this 
thesis examines whether likely instances of such re-representation correlate with measurable 
changes in cooperation between the two sides. 
 The models which International Relations scholars use to analyze problems of 
international conflict and cooperation can be classified into three general genres: game theory, 
psychological theory, and quantitative-empirical theory.1  Goldstein and Freeman (1990) contend 
that while these approaches are different in essential ways, they fundamentally describe “the 
same conception of strategy” which features two components.2  States form their strategy 
through both reciprocity: their reaction to the moves of another actor, and cooperative initiatives, 
which “get the ball rolling in the context of mutual reciprocity.”3  Since states form their strategy 
to address “problems,” the actors must first form a “problem representation” which “is generally 
recognized as the foundation of all decision making.”4  For this purpose, “actors” are the relevant 
decision making entities behind a state (ie. a dominant political party within a liberal democracy, 
an individual or small group in a totalitarian regime, etc.)  While a problem can exist in an 
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objective sense that is “independent of cognition,” a problem representation describes an actor’s 
cognitive definition.5   
 Reciprocity can itself consist of various strategies.  Perhaps the simplest is a basic “tit-
for-tat” strategy as described by Axelrod  (1984), which consists of an actor adopting whatever 
strategy they see the other side using.  According to Axelrod, when “tit-for-tat” is repeated by an 
actor numerous times in the context of a problem which resembles a Prisoner’s Dilemma, it leads 
to the optimal outcome for a particular side.6  In the first iteration of the game, the actor chooses 
to cooperate.  Thus when such a game is played numerous times, if the other side is choosing 
cooperation, or at least using a consistant “tit-for-tat” strategy, an optimal cooperative outcome 
results.  If the other side does not cooperate, the actor begins to reciprocate with non-
cooperation, thus still achieving the best outcome they can.  However, states sometimes make 
moves which violate “tit-for-tat” principles.   A state can decide the way to respond in reaction to 
many different influences.  They may take a pessimistic view of the situation, and choose to not 
cooperate no-matter what the other side does.  They may also respond to conflict with 
cooperation initiatives (giving an “olive-branch” to the other side).  The actor’s problem 
representation may directly support either sort of response (ie. an actor can decide the problem is 
not a Prisoner’s Dilemma) or the decision can be somewhat incidental (ie. an external factor such 
as U.S. policy might weigh in).  Either way, the actor’s problem representation forms the context 
underlying the decision to be made.  
 Since states exist and interact in the international order over extended periods of time, it 
is possible for problems and their representations to shift and develop over extended periods of 
time.  Billings and Hermann describe a model for sequential decision making which addresses 
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how the same one problem can be “re-represented” over time, taking into account the “legacy of 
the past” as well as the more traditional game-theoretic “shadow of the future concept”.7
 In analyzing problem representation, Billings and Hermann begin by presenting a 
“General Scheme for Sequential Decision Making” in which an actor goes from identifying their 
goals to seeing the discrepancy between those goals and reality and problem diagnosis, to 
formulating a decision and implementing it in the first 6 steps.8  In the remaining steps, the actor 
examines feedback and reconsiders the initial decision.9 As this process is repeated, the actor is 
influenced continually by feedback in a sort of “loop”. 
 Of key interest in the Billings and Hermann framework is the evolution of this process 
over time.  The choice made in each iteration of the feedback loop can be one of the following:  
A) Continue Present Course 
B) Change Basic Course but Make Adjustments 
C) Change Course, but not Problem Representation 
D) Re-Represent the Problem 
E) Reconsider Fundamental Goals10 
Of these, the first three would appear to comprise the most common courses of action.  While a 
decision maker can cycle through feedback loops constantly, monumental changes are relatively 
not as erratic since after an initial few iterations of decision making, the goals and problem of a 
decision maker are likely to stabilize.11
Billings and Hermann describe and classify various feedback events to the extent that 
they affect problem representation. The “legacy of the past” is critical in determining how an 
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actor reacts to feedback.  The “level of certainty” and “commitment to prior actions” that a 
policy maker has each time through the loop directly affects the nature of the decision they 
make.12  If an actor’s choices fail to achieve their goal, a “minority influence” may become part 
of the process, influencing the actors to alter their views.13  Whether the feedback is positive or 
negative can change these factors and cause the actor to continue or to change course 
respectively.  
Absent the later two choices at the end of each decision making loop, the actor maintains 
their representation whether they change course or not.  As is fairly intuitive to any observer of 
Middle East events, the same basic problems among actors in the region continue over long 
stretches of time.  While feedback events, both small and large, occur frequently, the 
fundamental conflict between Arabs and Israelis, and more specific conflict between certain 
Arab states/groups has lasted for decades in many cases.  Hence, it is entirely possibly that the 
problem representations themselves stay the same, and actors simply alter their approach from 
time to time.   
Billings and Hermann also suggest that either the fundamental goals and/or the problem 
itself can change aswell.  A change in resources, such as the aid available from a superpower 
could alter the priority of goals.  For example, when Syria has the strong backing of the Soviet 
Union, it might choose to pursue and aggressive anti-Egypt/Israeli peace stance.  With the loss of 
those resources, that goal may fall by the wayside. 
As they interpret feedback received following a decision, the way that an actor attributes 
the causation of events is critical closely tied to the likelihood of a problem re-representation.14  
Billings and Hermann, borrowing on the work of Heider (1958), categorize the attribution in 
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terms of coming from either external or internal sources, and as being transitory or permanent.15  
Problem re-representation is likely to occur when feedback suggests that either goals are unclear 
or the nature of a problem is not as it appeared, and this is attributed to an internal source (ie. the 
decision maker was unsure about their goals or had a “defective” interpretation of the 
problem).16  Conversely, external attributions often lead to changes in behavior without 
rethinking a problem, often with after-the-fact rationalization of why particular circumstances 
interfered with an otherwise appropriate choice.17  Internal attribution also does not ensure 
problem re-representation, since the failure of the actor’s strategy may be linked to the “choice of 
the wrong tactic or insufficient effort,” instead of problem representation, something which is 
especially possible when there is a viable opposing minority which threatens the decision making 
actor (ie. for victory in an upcoming election).18
The strategy-driving representation of a problem for a state can also change when 
external factors intervene, such as when there is a change in the leadership.  However, in such a 
case a problem is not “re-represented” by the same group.  Rather, the relevant actors are simply 
switched.  In a regime where the party in power changes frequently (ie. Israel), it is important to 
consider the potential for alternate problem representations to coexist. 
 The states of Israel and Syria provide an excellent real-world case of actors which have 
faced essentially the same problem for an extended period.  While most of their modern history 
has been characterized by a fundamental lack of cooperation, the 1990’s brought great, albeit 
abortive strides toward a potential peace.   
This thesis seeks to evaluate the framework of Billings and Hermann using the Israeli-
Syrian case to examine whether either actor likely re-represented their problem during this 
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critical period.  Since a multitude of variables can cause changes in the affairs of the two states, 
this search for a true instance of problem re-representation occurs in two stages.   
In the first stage, events during which a significant shift in the behavior of one or both 
states must be identified.  Then empirical details surrounding the decisions are analyzed 
according to the guidelines of the Billings and Hermann framework to determine whether each 
case is consistent with the prescription for problem re-representation.   
Finally in the second stage, the aftermath of any probable re-representation found in the 
first stage analysis is tested in order to determine whether its effects substantively altered the 
future behavioral patterns of the re-representing actor enough that they are inconsistent with the 
actors previous representation. 
 In stage I., by evaluating the case study of the Barak administration and its immediate 
aftermath, I attempt to reconcile empirical evidence of the psychological process of the actors 
with the criteria of the Billings and Hermann model.  Under this scheme, problem re-
representation is viewed as a dependent variable and sequences of events which trigger it are 
independent variables.   
In stage II., representation of the problem is the independent variable and a patterns of 
conflict/cooperation over time are the dependent variable.  The purpose of this stage is to try to 
compare what might otherwise criticized as an arbitrary label of re-representation with ‘real 
world’ indicators of the diplomatic disposition of the relevant actor.  I examine three factors: the 





 Building on Billings and Hermann’s ideas, this thesis addresses the issue of whether there 
are instances of problem re-representation in Israeli-Syrian relations which lead to a change in 
the prevalent patterns of cooperation between the two states.  Specifically: 
 
 Hypothesis A:  If the Labor Party (as demonstrated by the regime of Ehud Barak), 
changed its problem representation in 1999, then it will be found to have an 
observable shift from uncooperative strategy or “tit-for-tat” strategy, to a high 
cooperation and “olive branch” strategy.  The Barak government developed a 
consensus that it needed to do more than what seems to have been a mixture of military 
actions coupled with continued occupation of Lebanon (pessimistic, unilateral conflict).  
It took upon itself to make a significant cooperative gesture (high cooperation, “olive-
branch”), the pullout from Lebanon, in hopes of changing the nature of its situation 
hoping to eventually at least a “tit-for-tat” response on the part of Syria. 
 
Hypothesis B:  If the Labor Party, following the withdrawal from Lebanon, changed 
its problem representation again to be pessimistic about cooperative initiatives, then 
it will be found to have lead to an observable shift from a high cooperation, “olive 
branch” strategy to “tit-for-tat” and unilateral uncooperative strategy.  The new 
feedback following the re-representation described by Hypothesis A contradicted the 
expectations which the Barak administration held for their action.  Thus, realizing an 
error on their part, they reverted to a pessimistic or at best “tit-for-tat” representation. 
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Hypothesis C:  If Syria, following the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces from 
Lebanon changed its problem representation, then it will be found to have shifted 
from a cooperative and “tit-for-tat” strategy to unilateral uncooperative strategy.  
Prior to the Israeli pullout from Lebanon, Syria had reciprocated Israeli cooperation and 
the two sides had made significant progress towards a peace treaty.  However, after 




 The relations between Syria and Israel have been stormy since the latter’s inception.  
Since Hafiz al-Asad came to power in Syria in 1970, forming the basic regime framework, which 
exists under his son today, several consistant areas of conflict have formed the basis the 
relationship of the two states.   
The territory of the Golan Heights, which Israel seized during the 1967 war, has 
consistently been an object of contention—so much so that it perhaps provided the critical 
mandate for the Asad regime’s legitimacy.  The return of the Golan to Syrian hands has been 
widely seen as the key groundwork in any prospective Israel-Syrian peace treaty.19  
A far more broad and complex issue however has dominated Israeli’s relations with Syria 
however.  Israel’s general divide over the Palestinian issue with Arab states has long 
materialized itself in the Syrian case through the conduit of their mutual neighbor Lebanon. After 
“the Golan front” became in essence “frozen” after the 1973 war, Lebanon became the 
“battlefield” for Israel and Syria.20   
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While modern Syria has often viewed Lebanon as an extension of “Greater Syria,” it had 
acknowledged and respected its sovereignty since the 1940’s and the two states had taken 
distinct paths until the mid-1970’s.21  Then, during a period of civil unrest which began in 1976 
between Maronite Christians and Muslims for control of the country, Syria intervened by force 
and “had by 1977 established his virtual hegemony over most of Lebanon.”22  From that point 
onward Hafiz al-Asad imposed his “Two independent states, one people” rhetoric.23
In the early 1970’s, Lebanon became a staging ground for the PLO after it was forced out 
of Jordan.24  By 1974, Israel was conducting “preventative” operations within Lebanon.25  After 
years of attacks from Lebanese territory, the IDF began Operation Peace for the Galilee in June 
1982 creating a 25-mile buffer into Lebanese territory.26  This major Syrian presence in Lebanon 
would remain until May 2000, setting the stage for Israeli-Syrian competition and conflict over 
the country. 
Through the early 1990’s, the Israeli-Syrian relationship remained intensely hostile and in 
that sense stable.  Even among Arab states, Asad’s Syria took a particularly hardliner stance 
toward Israel during this period, as exemplified by their reaction to the Israeli-Egyptian peace.27  
The chaos of the civil war in Lebanon during the 1980’s only served to further entrench the two 
sides in the deeply troubled country.  However, by around 1990 the circumstances began to 
change, as the Taif accord ended the Lebanon war and the surrounding international order 
shifted.  During the Cold War, “the Soviet Union had been the prime source of political, military, 
and economic aid and support for the Syrians, and moreover had provided strategic backing in 
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the face of a possible Israeli or US attack on Syria.”28  From its standpoint, Syria had long 
viewed the US with contempt because it believed that Israel “owed its existence and allegiance 
to the Western powers.29 However, after “the radical change in the world order removed the 
main pillar of Syria’s foreign policy strategy,” its participation in the international coalition 
during the Gulf War led to an “unexpected opportunity to work more closely with the US.”30  
Following the events of 1991, the tone was set and “Israel, Syria, and all of Israel’s other 
neighbors sat down together at a peace conference in Madrid, with the avowed aim of reaching 
final peace agreements among them.”31   
As the US-backed negotiations proceeded, an external blow in came to Syria when the 
Palestinian Authority and Jordan signed peace agreements with Israel.  Damascus took the view 
that this agreement weakened “their bargaining position and damaged the chances of a full 
restoration of the Golan Heights.”32  “For the moment it was proved to Israel that peaceful 
relations were attainable with most of the Arab world without a peace agreement with Syria, 
[and] it seems that Jerusalem’s as well as Washington’s motivation for advancing such an 
agreement at any cost decreased.”33   At the same time, Syria maintained a long tradition of 
linking its relations to Palestinian issues.34  By 1995 however, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak 
Rabin had agreed secretly, in negotiations mediated by the Clinton Administration, to withdrawal 
from the Golan.35  Over the next year, negotiations proceeded, however, momentum slowed 
under Rabin’s successor, Shimon Peres who had not even been informed of the Golan “deposit” 
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prior to Rabin’s death.36  The talks made significant progress, but ultimately deteriorated with 
Peres’ decision to launch Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon, and his subsequent electoral 
loss to Benjamin Netanyahu.37
When the Likud Party was in control from 1996-1999, there was little meaningful 
negotiation with Syria, however, Ehud Barak’s 1999 election brought in a Labor party 




To detect a problem re-representation, the case study of a single type of actor (ie. Israel-
Labor party, Syria) inserted into the decision making framework and analyzed multiple cycles of 
the loop Billings and Hermann describe.  A basic sequence of indications should accompany any 
problem re-representation.  First, the initial representation must lead to a strategy which fails. 
This is detectable so long as one can observe evidence a problem still exists (ie. 
violence/displays of tension in a conflict).  Naturally, success will confirm a representation, 
ending the cycle and eventually the problem.  Second, the evaluation of feedback must suggest to 
the actor that their strategy failed because of flaws in their goals or understanding of the 
problem.  This is detectable either directly in public discourse or by observing the nature of 
subsequent decisions.  Theoretically, they might never reach this conclusion, since external 
events may intercede continually, or the initial representation may indeed be correct while their 
approach is wrong.  Finally, the actor will take a new action or follow a new strategy which is 
consistant with a different problem representation.  In isolate representations from external 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 75 
37 Ibid., 76 
38Zisser, 121-124 
 13
events and leadership difference as much as possible, I have chosen to focus on a single 
administration—that of Ehud Barak—for Israel, and primarily through Hafiz-al Asad’s regime in 
Syria (though I suspect his son’s takeover is not nearly as much of a change as a new Israeli 
administration.) 
To be detectable, the action must also be inconsistent with the initial representation.  As 
such, an obvious issue for an outside observer is that a new action may also be consistent with 
the previous representation.  Unless the actor explicitly indicates to the observer that their 
representation is changed, this is an inherent source of ‘false-negative’ error.  However, this 
possibility is rendered mute by the fact that a strategy which is consistant with the initial 
representation will likely only result from a re-representation not distinct enough to be of any 
major interest. 
In Appendix A ad B I have mapped out paths that Israel and Syria have taken over time 
based on my case study, including instances I believe may represent problem re-representation 
based on what is available to me as an outside observer.  I sought to find cases where there was 
no compelling possibility of an explanation other than problem re-representation.  In addition to 
regime changes being excluded, I rejected events during which the United States or another third 
party played a pivotal role. 
 
Stage II. 
 In order to scrutinize the instances of re-representation found in the case study, I treated 
these situations as a quasi-experiment using an interrupted time series of cooperation data, 
juxtaposed with the hypothetical re-representations.  Hudson, Schrodt, and Whitmer (2004) 
demonstrate how patterns can be observed in quantitative bilateral cooperation data and how 
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“their frequency corresponds to changes in the qualitative characteristics of the conflict.”39  
Where such changes occur in Stage I. cases, conflict/cooperation data is plotted using their web-
based tool (available at ep.jhax.org).  By default, this tool contains numerous data sets from the 
KEDS project.  The Levant data sets available as of March 2005 are problematic, as the sources 
used to create them are not consistant.40  Specifically, the older data is compiled from Reuters, 
and newer data is from Agence France Presse (AFP).   
Due to this inconsistency, I have constructed my own data set based on the KEDS Levant 
data set using AFP for the entire period of interest.  Since this project required only a subset of 
what had been done in the Levant data, articles were downloaded from Lexis-Nexis using the 
nexispider.pl program and the search string, “ISRAEL! OR PALESTIN! OR SYRIA! OR 
LEBAN! OR PLO”.  Thus, all irrelevant actors except Palestine and Lebanon were excluded.  
Palestine and Lebanon were retained as a reference to ensure the resulting data made sense and 
to permit possible observation of Lebanon independently as side curiosity.  The resulting files 
were then run through nexisreverse.pl with output then fed into the TABARI program using the 
same actor, verb, and option as the published Levant data set in the manner described in the 
KEDS/TABARI documentation. 
Ray Whitmer kindly added the resulting data to the ep.jhax.org web tool.  Outputs of 
conflict/cooperation patterns for actors SYR and ISR were generated for the time periods 
relevant to each hypothesis using the “text” button of the application.  Due to the frequency of 
data available for Syria and Israel, a time interval of 21 days per unit was chosen.  This allows 
for a reasonable number of events to occur in each data point, yet provides numerous data points 
for comparison and conjecture. 
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There are two types of data used here to check for the effects of a problem re-
representation.  First, the raw number of material and verbal, conflict and cooperation events for 
each 21-day block provide a view of the type of actions a side is taking during a specific point in 
time.  Since there was a relatively low frequency of material events, verbal actions are analyzed 
to prevent errors from lack of data.   
Second, these are examined with respect to one another to determine whether an action 
was unilateral (done without the other side taking one first), “tit-for-tat” (a response to the other 
sides immediately preceding action, or an “olive branch” pattern where one side reacts with 
cooperation in response to conflict from the other side.41
While an isolated unilateral action is not necessarily meaningful, especially when the 
overall frequency of events is relatively low, a series of either “tit-for-tat” or “olive branch” 
activity over a significant period is a strong statement of one side’s approach to solving their 





 Hypothesis A states that if the Labor Party (as demonstrated by the regime of Ehud 
Barak), changed its problem representation in 1999, then it will be found to have an observable 
shift from uncooperative strategy or “tit-for-tat” strategy, to a high cooperation and “olive 
branch” strategy.   
As depicted in Appendix A, Labor’s initial problem representation viewed Lebanon as 
both a military asset and one to use as leverage in negotiations with Syria. For the purposes of 
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this study, the initial problem representation leading to the presence in Lebanon is assumed to 
predate the period in question: the peace talks of the 1990’s and their aftermath.    
The initial representation is exemplified by a predominantly “tit-for-tat” strategy—that is 
to say that Israel would maintain their occupation, or withdraw it based on moves by Syria. The 
Labor had remained consistant that cooperative moves by Syria would be reciprocated, and in 
fact demanded Syria make initial steps (as incidently the Netanyahu government had between 
Labor administrations as well). There is evidence that under Rabin and Peres, Israel was on the 
brink of making concessions, but only based on Syrian reciprocal action or guarantees thereof.  
However, by the time of Ehud Barak’s administration, or soon after, violence in Lebanon had 
shifted public opinion of the occupation to the extent which was necessary to decisively weight 
on the decision making of the Labor party actor to shift their representation.42  Movements 
denouncing the occupation such as “Four Mothers”—an anti-occupation group formed after a 
helicopter crash killed seventy-three IDF soldiers while ferrying them to Lebanon, gained greater 
momentum through increased media coverage.43 Further, the content of news coverage changed 
to include more battlefield footage, and “beginning in 1997, Hezbullah began taping every 
ambush, roadside bomb, and mortar attack on IDF soldiers” which was then shown on Israeli 
television.44 The internal effects of public opinion caused a rethinking of southern Lebanon’s 
importance to Israeli security and led to a new representation of the problem. 
The second column of Appendix A depicts this re-representation.  Based on repetitive 
feedback received from years of occupation and various more minor changes in military posture, 
Israel determined that occupying Lebanon was actually fueling terrorism and hurting Israel’s 
situation.  Based on this internally attributed feedback, without any equivalent gesture on the side 
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of Syria, Israel made a unilateral decision that leaving Lebanon would reduce violence and lead 
to improved relations.  The new representation was inherently a unilateral cooperative initiative, 
which did not await a move on Syria’s part.  
The Barak government gradually discussed a partial pullout, and finally settled on, and 
announced a full retreat late in 1999.  Negotiations with Syria had stalled.  Israel’s 
implementation of the withdrawal plan also went forward despite numerous violent incidents 
associated with the Lebanon occupation.  For the purposes of this analysis, this representation 
was in effect with certainty from fall 1999 until the May 24, 2000 pullout and before and after 
this period for some less certain length of time.   
During, I would expect to see an increase in cooperation independent of Syria’s actions, 
as well as likely instances of “olive branch” behavior, where Israel continues cooperative actions 
despite conflict from Syria. 
Since there is no good source for data on Labor just prior to Barak actually being in 
office since the previous administation is considered a different actor, there is some possibility 
that the actual change in problem representation is not covered.  However, I did not locate media 
coverage (in AFP articles used for data) until late July, 1999 of serious discussions for a pullout 
from Lebanon.  Therefore, the block starting 8/9/99 was chosen as a starting point.  Mentions of 
the pullout plan occur regularly from this point onward for the new problem representation. 
When examining Israel’s verbal cooperation events, there is a visually distinct increase 
over this period (and incidentally over anything in the Netanyahu period aswell which roughly 
appears to resemble the first three months of Barak’s).  This would appear to suggest that in 
terms of action taken, the detectable differentiation between Barak and Netanyahu’s 










































































































































ISR->SYR Verbal Cooperation to Case Study Representation A 
 















*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
There is a statistically significant correlation between the verbal cooperation on the part 
of Israel from shortly before Barak’s administration took over to after the decision to pullout 
became public.  This supports a portion of Hypothesis A.  It should be noted that the correlation 
was taken from February 1999, due to the lack of data. Though Benjamin Netanyahu was in 
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office for the first few data points, the assumption is that strategy was not shifted instantly after 
Barak took office, which makes that data consistant with the initial problem representation.  A 
survey of the data from the Netanyahu administration supports this since verbal cooperation was 
at roughly the same range throughout. 
Upon close inspection of events for the period, it appears that using the available data for 
“tit-for-tat” with this hypothesis is inappropriate, since too many of the events were isolated 
external factors namely violence surrounding the air strikes in early 2000, and therefore unlikely 
to relate to problem representation.  While Israel may appear to be engaged in “tit-for-tat” 
behavior, this course of action was instigated by terrorist organizations which are a third party to 
this analysis and therefore cloud any attempt to describe problem representation vis-à-vis Syria. 
 The increase of verbal cooperation events however, supports the hypothesis in showing 
that Israel did in fact change its behavior, greatly enhancing its positive verbal gestures 
Test of Re-representation A and “Olive Branch” instances  
 
Count  
  Israeli Olive Branch Total 
  0 1   
Re-rep A 0 4 0 4 
  1 11 3 14 
Total 15 3 18 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
 







Pearson Chi-Square 1.029(b) 1 .310    
Continuity 
Correction(a) .064 1 .800    
Likelihood Ratio 1.672 1 .196    
Fisher's Exact Test     1.000 .446 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .971 1 .324    
N of Valid Cases 18      
a  Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b  3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .67. 
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 As for “olive branch” behavior, a Chi-square test failed to find a significant correlation.  
However, the only instances of this pattern observed occurred in the second representation.  
While this is somewhat encouraging, it does not provide conclusive evidence supporting 
Hypothesis A on its own grounds. 
 
Hypothesis B 
 Hypothesis B states that if the Labor Party, following the withdrawal from Lebanon, 
changed its problem representation again to be pessimistic about cooperative initiatives, then it 
will be found to have lead to an observable shift from a high cooperation, “olive branch” strategy 
to “tit-for-tat” and unilateral uncooperative strategy. 
The initial representation for this hypothesis is the ‘new’ one derived in Hypothesis A 
and described in Appendix A, Column 2.  Following the pullout from Lebanon, feedback the 
Barak administration received did not meet their expectations.  There was virtually no gain 
realized on the part of Syria’s response or otherwise 
Billings and Hermann suggest that shifts representations take a “U” shaped curve: they 
are most likely to occur rather quickly or after a prolonged period, with the likelihood decreasing 
in between.45  While a new representation may be subject to second-guessing, once a 
representation is not dismissed immediately, it is then likely to gain strength and persist for a 
long period.  While the Hypothesis A representation occurred after a long period of 
reconsiderations, the Hypothesis B re-representation was of the rapid kind.  Almost immediately 
after the withdrawl, Hezbollah claimed victory, and they reorganized themselves, consolidating 
control in southern Lebanon.  Palestinian groups took case as an “example” of how violence can 
bring about a desired outcome and the Al-Aqsa Intafada four months later dashed any hopes of 
                                                 
45 Billings and Hermann, 75 
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the pullout bringing about reduced violence.  More critically however, Syria did not reciprocate 
the move (until 2005) despite pressure from many different external parties to do so.  In effect, 
Israel lost everything it had to lose, and gained nothing it had wished to gain. 
If this is the case, I expect that there would be a return to the lower levels of cooperation 
present before the Barak administration made its initial re-representation.  The instances of 
“olive-branch” behavior cease or greatly diminish.  While Israel may perhaps ‘feel burned’ by 
their recent mistake and thus proceed more cautiously to respond cooperatively, “tit-for-tat” 
behavior inclusive of cooperative reciprocity should be found, especially since the failure of 
Israel’s policy seen as an internal blunder, and not the result of Syria itself doing something 
negative independently. 

































































































































 While re-occupying the territory was not pursed, the realization that an internal mistake 
had been made came rapidly translated into a return to “tit-for-tat” strategy, as demonstrated by 
the air strikes of October 2000 through the end of Barak’s term.   
ISR->SYR Verbal Cooperation to Case Study Representation B 
 
    Re-rep B ISR->SYR Verbal Cooperation 
Re-Rep B Pearson 
Correlation 1 -.499(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed) . .007






  Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .
  N 28 28
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 There is a significant correlation between the change in verbal cooperation and the time 
of period of the new representation.  This supports Hypothesis B.  
Test of Re-representation B and “Tit-for-Tat” 
 
Count  
  Israel Tit-for-Tat Total 
  0 1   
Re-rep B 0 10 5 15 
  1 9 1 10 
Total 19 6 25 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
 







Pearson Chi-Square 1.791(b) 1 .181    
Continuity 
Correction(a) .740 1 .390    
Likelihood Ratio 1.957 1 .162    
Fisher's Exact Test     .345 .198 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.719 1 .190    
N of Valid Cases 25      
a  Computed only for a 2x2 table 





Test of Re-representation B and “Olive Branch” instances  
 
Count  
  Israeli Olive Branch Total 
  0 1   
Re-rep B 0 13 2 15 
  1 9 1 10 
Total 22 3 25 
  
 Chi-Square Tests 
 







Pearson Chi-Square .063(b) 1 .802    
Continuity 
Correction(a) .000 1 1.000    
Likelihood Ratio .064 1 .800    
Fisher's Exact Test     1.000 .654 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .061 1 .806    
N of Valid Cases 25      
a  Computed only for a 2x2 table 





 There are fewer “tit-for-tat” instances after the re-representation, yet the difference is not 
significant.  Therefore the instances of “tit-for-tat” do not support Hypothesis B.  As with 
Hypothesis A, there is not a statistically significant correlation between either the “olive branch” 
or “tit-for-tat” patterns that would support Hypothesis B.   
 
Hypothesis C 
 Hypothesis C states that if Syria, following the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces 
from Lebanon, changed its problem representation, then it will be found to have shifted from a 
cooperative and “tit-for-tat” strategy to unilateral uncooperative strategy.   
 Before the Israeli pullout from Lebanon, Hafiz al-Asad was willing to engage in a 
cooperative warming of Syrian-Israeli relations.  Heavily dependent of United States mediation, 
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the elder Asad had sought to regain the Golan Heights and in return was willing to make security 
concessions to the Israelis.  After the pause in the peace talks from 1996-1999, the two sides 
came into disagreement over details of secret commitments Yitzhak Rabin had made, yet the 
basic premise of a possible agreement remained.46  Support for Hezbollah and the ten Damascus-
based militant organizations, in addition to the token guarantee of Syrian non-aggression were 
Asad’s bargaining chips.   
Thus, column 1 of Appendix 2 illustrates the pre-pullout representation from the Asad 
government.  Asad was interested in making peace, however only if he could achieve his goal of 
regaining the Golan Heights and promoting Syria’s security. 
 While Bashir Asad replaced his father just after the pullout occurred, all indications are 
that he retained his father’s representation of the problem, despite perhaps a notably weaker 
practical ability to respond to any potential Israeli concessions on the Golan.  Since no such 
offers were made however, this is irrelevant.  The Israeli pullout from Lebanon, saw a direct 
reaction from the “Arab street” which had been reenergized by the weakening of Arab 
governments in general during the late 1990’s.47  As Israel found itself confronted by the upsurge 
in violence, Bashir maintained Syria’s posture, which conveniently was the easiest course of 
action anyway due to his weakness relative to his father.48
 As depicted in the second column of Appendix B, Syria found itself in a far more 
pessimistic position after the Israeli pullout.  Due to the popular response, Syria could neither 
take credit for the pullout, nor could now effectively initiate negotiations.  For this reason I 
precidict that cooperation and “olive-branch” instances will diminish on Syria’s part. 
                                                 
46 Seale, 75 
47 Eyal Zisser, “Is Anyone Afraid of Israel”, The Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2001, 5 
48 Eyal Zisser, “Does Bashir Al-Assad Rule Syria?”, 1-4 
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SYR-ISR Verbal Cooperation to Case Study Representation B 
 
    Re-rep C 
SYR-ISR Verbal 
Cooperation 
Re-rep C Pearson 
Correlation 1 -.375(*)
  Sig. (2-tailed) . .034






  Sig. (2-tailed) .034 .
  N 32 32
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 There is a significant correlation between Syrian verbal cooperation and the case study 




Test of Re-representation B and “Tit-for-Tat” 
 
Count  
  Syria Tit for Tat Total 
  0 1   
Re-rep C 0 15 3 18 
  1 11 3 14 
Total 26 6 32 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
 







Pearson Chi-Square .117(b) 1 .732     
Continuity 
Correction(a) .000 1 1.000     
Likelihood Ratio .117 1 .733     
Fisher's Exact Test       1.000 .540 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .114 1 .736     
N of Valid Cases 32         
a  Computed only for a 2x2 table 




Test of Re-representation B and “Olive Branch” 
   
  Syria Olive Branch Total 
  0 1   
Re-rep C 0 13 5 18 
  1 11 3 14 
Total 24 8 32 
 
 Chi-Square Tests 
 







Pearson Chi-Square .169(b) 1 .681     
Continuity 
Correction(a) .000 1 1.000     
Likelihood Ratio .171 1 .679     
Fisher's Exact Test       1.000 .504 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .164 1 .685     
N of Valid Cases 32         
a  Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b  2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.50. 
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As is clear on the previous page, the http://ep.jhax.org tool did not provide data for “tit-
for-tat” and “olive branch” that had a statistically significant correlation with the re-
representation.  The difference in the frequency of “tit-for-tat” and “olive branch” does not 
support Hypothesis C. 
 
Conclusion 
 There are three primary conclusions reached.  First, Billings and Hermann’s framework 
for problem re-representation is applicable to the cases of Israel and Syria during the time period 
studied.  The actions of both governments fit into the framework and the actual course of events 
studied appears to follow the theoretical requirements which they describe.  Second, the changes 
in problem representation clearly correlate with changes in the level of verbal cooperation 
displayed by the actor re-representing their problem, and thus support the notion underlying the 
hypotheses, that re-representation has an impact on verbal conflict and cooperation.  Finally, the 
instances of “tit-for-tat” and “olive branch” patterns do not show a correlation with the cases of 
re-representation, and thus changes in these indicators do not support any of the specific 
hypotheses, as stated. 
 While the first two findings are very encouraging, I do not consider the third to mean that 
this method of locating changes in behavior is invalid.  The attempt to utilize patterns of 
cooperation and conflict, beyond simply comparing changes in the level of occurrence of these 
indicators, was unsuccessful. However, the method used was inherently problematic.  Hudson, 
Schrodt, and Whitmer discuss calibration issues with the tool which was used and how patterns 
are “relative” rather than absolute.49  For example, using the 21-day scale, cooperation 
suggesting an “olive branch” instance would be “relative” to an instance of conflict on the part of 
                                                 
49 Hudson, Schrodt, Whitmer, 38-39 
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the other actor in the previous 21-day value.  Hudson et al. note calibration is necessary for such 
patterns to be meaningful.  As such, the lack of correlation found with this method is not reliable 
enough to decisively dismiss the portion of the hypotheses which dealt with these patterns of 
action. 
With the scale utilized, there were both “olive branch” and “tit-for-tat” patterns detected, 
and to some extent they did coincide with what would be expected.  However, they did not do so 
in a manner which would be statistically significant.  For this reason, the lack of correlation with 
this particular data should not be interpreted as a cause to reject the spirit of the hypothesis.  
Rather, it displays the difficulty in attempting to automate the process of finding causational 
relationships in conflict and cooperation. 
 
Comparing the data from the administration of Ehud Barak with those of his predecessor 
and successor further supports the likelihood that the tools for measurement created the problem.  
The frequency of events in the Barak administration was actually far more dynamic and the 
average number of events was significantly higher than at other periods.  It was in fact it appears 
 29
that the ‘best case’ scenario within the available data in which to hope to find “olive branch” or 
“tit-for-tat” patterns was during the Barak administration.  The administrations before and after, 
have very low data levels, typically 5 or lower per 21-day period.  Instances of the patterns are 
therefore even more rare, and over certain significant blocks of time, they are in fact non-
existent. 
Correlation between Syrian and Israeli Verbal Cooperation levels 
 
 









Correlation 1 .959(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 





Correlation .959(**) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
  N 28 28 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
However, there is also a notable correlation between Syrian behavior and Israeli behavior 
during the time period studied.  While this is not “tit-for-tat” in the exact sense, it does show that 
the there is a close linkage at a general level.  It suggests that perhaps a “tit-for-tat” style 
relationship is present, but not distinct enough in the data available to show up as statistically 
significant with a certain problem representation.    
 Further studies might involve using different sources of data, with more frequent events, 
as well as other, more easily measurable patterns.  It would also be desirable to find a 
quantitative way to decisively isolate the effects of problem representation from those of other 
variables that may influence behavior.  The approach used here focused on observing the effects 
of a priori instances of re-representation instead of firmly isolating them throughout the time-
line.  It may not be possible to locate them a posteriori without creating a vastly more complex 
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model scheme of interpreting data.  With a more detailed and precise data set—perhaps 
practically requiring the observation different set of actors—it may be possible to more 
rigorously scrutinize, quantitatively and empirically, the effects of the psychological process that 
Billings and Hermann describe. 
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Appendix B Case Study: Syrian Problem Representation 
 
